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Theoretical frameworks for neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice. 
 
Abstract: 
Intertemporal choice has drawn attention in behavioral economics, econophysics, and 
neuroeconomics. Recent studies in mainstream economics have mainly focused on 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice (dynamic inconsistency); while 
impulsivity/impatience in intertemporal choice has been extensively studied in 
behavioral economics of addiction. However, recent advances in neuroeconomic and 
econophysical studies on intertemporal choice have made it possible to study both 
impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice within a unified framework. In 
this paper I propose the new frameworks for investigations into neuroeconomics of 
intertemporal choice. The importance of studying neurochemical and 
neuroendocrinological modulations of intertemporal choice and time-perception (e.g. 
serotonin, dopamine, cortisol, testosterone, and epinephrine) is emphasized. 
 
Keywords: Econophysics; Impulsivity; Intertemporal choice; Inconsistency; 
Neuroeconomics; Neuroendocrinology
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Extended Abstract: 
 
Intertemporal choice has drawn attention in behavioral economics, econophysics, and 
neuroeconomics and under strong influences by neuropharmacological modulations. 
This confirms the importance of studying intertemporal choice by utilizing 
neuroeconomic methodology. Consider the following intertemporal choice problems: 
 
(A) Choose between (A.1) One cup of coffee now. 
                 (A.2) Two cups of coffee tomorrow. 
(B) Choose between (B.1) One cup of coffee in one year. 
                 (B.2) Two cups of coffee in [one year plus one day]. 
 
Most people may make the impulsive choice in problem (A) (i.e., choosing (A.1), 
preference for the small immediate reward); while the same subjects make the patient 
choice in problem (B) (i.e., choosing (B.2), preference for the large delayed reward). 
The combination of these typical intertemporal choices is inconsistent, because the 
time-interval [between (A1) and (A2)] and the time-interval [between (B1) and (B2)] 
are the same (=1 day). Most people's intertemporal choice plan in the example B will be 
reversed in the intertemporal choice action in the example A, as the time of executing 
the planned action approaches to the present. 
Although decision under uncertainty has been well formulated with the 
prospect theory, behavioral economic theories on intertemporal choice still have 
problems in explaining observed anomalies (e.g., dynamic inconsistency). Contrary to 
normative economic theory on intertemporal choice (i.e., exponential discounting), it 
has now been well established that human and animal intertemporal choice behaviors 
are not rational (i.e., inconsistent). For this reason, recent economic theory on dynamic 
optimization and behavioral decision theory on intertemporal choice have adopted a 
hyperbolic discount model, rather than an exponential discount model. The hyperbolic 
discount model can explain the widely-observed tendency of human and animal 
intertemporal choice---i.e., decreasing impatience. In other words, subjects overestimate 
their patience in the distant future, resulting in preference reversal as time passes. The 
preference reversal in hyperbolic discounting may explain various problematic 
behaviors by humans---loss of self-control, failure in planned abstinence from addictive 
drugs, or a deadline rush due to procrastination. 
Neurobiological and psychological factors determining individual differences 
in intertemporal choice have been explored in recent behavioral and neuro- economics. 
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Recent studies in mainstream economics have mainly focused on inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice (dynamic inconsistency) especially in terms of economic policy; 
while impulsivity/impatience in intertemporal choice has been extensively studied in the 
behavioral economics of addiction,. Behavioral and neuroeconomic studies have found 
that (i) addicts (e.g., cigarette smokers, alcoholics, pathological gamblers, heroin addicts, 
cocaine addicts, and amphetamine abusers) have large time-discount rates in 
comparison to non-drug-using controls, (ii) neuroactive hormones such as cortisol (a 
stress hormone) and testosterone (a male hormone) are associated with temporal 
discounting, (iii) neurotransmitters such as serotonin, dopamine, and adrenaline (or 
adrenalin/epinephrine, of which activity in the brain can be non-invasively be assessed 
by measuring salivary alpha-amylase levels), and related neural circuits, are associated 
with temporal discount rates. Therefore, while it can be said that the ways in which 
impulsivity in intertemporal choice (indicated by a discount rate) is modulated by 
neurobiological factors has intensively studied, another important factor in 
intertemporal choice, (i.e., inconsistency in intertemporal choice) has been less 
extensively examined in a quantitatively rigorous manner in neuroeconomics.  
Fortunately however, recent advances in neuroeconomic and econophysical 
studies on intertemporal choice have made it possible to dissociate impulsivity and 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice within a unified framework. More tellingly, in the 
q-exponential discount model (based on non-extensive thermostatistical physics), 
impulsivity and consistency are distinctly parametrized. The q-exponential discount 
model is capable of parametrizing subject's inconsistency and impulsivity, separately, in 
a continuous manner. On the other hand, the generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount 
model, recently proposed in neuroeconomics---note that the conventional 
quasi-hyperbolic model (i.e., a β−δ model) has been proposed in behavioral 
economics---can parametrize an internal conflict within an agent between impulsive and 
patient selves at each time-point in intertemporal choice. However, the relationships 
between these two models and conventional exponential and hyperbolic discount 
models have not been studied in neuroeconomics. I stress the importance of examining 
neuromodulation of the parameters in these two novel discount models in future 
neuropsychoeconomic studies. 
In this paper, I will first review the current status of behavioral and neuro- 
economics of temporal discounting, with an emphasis on the neurochemistry of 
intertemporal choice. The effects of neurotranstmitters such as serotnonin and dopamine, 
and neuroactive hormones such as stress hormones, male hormones, and adrenaline 
(epinephrine) on human intertemporal choice are introduced. I next propose new 
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theoretical frameworks for investigations into the neuroeconomics of intertemporal 
choice, and show how these novel frameworks may lead to a better understanding of 
neuropsychoeconomic decision processes in intertemporal choice. The role of nonlinear 
time-perception following the Weber-Fechner law in intertemporal choice is also stated. 
The psychophysics of time-perception may explain many types of anomalies in 
intertemporal choice----hyperbolicity, subadditivity, and delay/date effects. Finally, 
some conclusions and implications from the present analysis are presented in relation to 
future study directions. In discussing future study directions, I have also mentioned the 
importance of examining the relationship between intertemporal choice and decision 
under uncertainty, and the usefulness of the novel frameworks for analyzing consistency 
of governmental economic policy-making. 
In summary, this article addresses the importance of studying neurochemical 
and neuroendocrinological modulations of time-perception and intertemporal choice 
(e.g. serotonin, dopamine, cortisol, testosterone, adrenaline), as well as the extension of 
the analysis into group and governmental decision processes by utilizing the present 
proposed theoretical frameworks. The study directions suggested in this article may aid 
in the understanding of neurobiological processing underlying intertemporal choice, and 
resolve the libertarian paternalism controversy occurring between behavioral and 
neoclassical economists. 
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1. Intertemporal choice by humans and animals 
 
 Subjects often prefer small but immediate rewards to large but delayed ones 
(temporal discounting). Behavioral and neuro- economic studies have demonstrated that, 
in human and animal discounting behavior, “impulsivity” in intertemporal choice 
(“impatience”) is dependent on the length of delay until receipt (Ainslie, 2005; Bickel 
and Marsch, 2001; Bickel et al., 2006; Frederick et al., 2002; Mazur, 1987; Prelec, 
2004; Reynolds, 2006; Takahashi, 2005, for a formal model of discounting in 
neoclassical economics, see Appendix I). Specifically, when choosing between smaller 
sooner rewards and larger later ones, people tend to be patient in the distant future but 
impulsive in the near future. In order to illustrate how this "decreasing impatience" is 
associated with inconsistency in intertemporal choice (referred to as "preference 
reversal" and "dynamic inconsistency" in economics), let us consider the following two 
intertemporal choice problems: 
 
(A) Choose between (A.1) One cup of coffee now. 
                 (A.2) Two cups of coffee tomorrow. 
(B) Choose between (B.1) One cup of coffee in one year. 
                 (B.2) Two cups of coffee in [one year plus one day]. 
 
Most people may make the impulsive choice in problem (A) (i.e., choosing (A.1), 
preference for the small immediate reward); while the same subjects make the patient 
choice in problem (B) (i.e., choosing (B.2), preference for the larger but more delayed 
reward). The combination of these typical intertemporal choices is inconsistent, because 
the time-intervals between [from (A1) to (A2)] and [from (B1) to (B2)] are the same (=1 
day). As the time of executing the planned action approaches to the present, most 
people's intertemporal choice plan in example B will be reversed in the intertemporal 
choice action in example A. Therefore, it can be said that most people are patient in 
their plan for the distant future, but impulsive in their intertemporal choice action 
occurring in the near future ("decreasing impatience"), resulting in a “preference 
reversal” as time passes. This time-inconsistent intertemporal choice cannot be 
described with the exponential discount function (Mazur, 1987; Prelec, 2004; Ainslie, 
2005). Furthermore, this "dynamic inconsistency" is also problematic for governmental 
policy making, as well as for individual decision-making. Accordingly, several 
economists have been awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for their contributions to 
understandings of dynamic inconsistency (i.e., Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 
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in 2004; Edmund S. Phelps in 2006).  
Because animals also show this type of time-inconsistent intertemporal choice 
behavior, several animal learning theorists proposed a (simple) hyperbolic discount 
model: V(D)=V(0)/(1+kD), where V(D) is the subjective value of the reward available 
at delay D (V(0) is therefore the subjective value at delay D=0, i.e., the value of an 
immediate reward) (Ainslie, 2005; Mazur, 1987). It is to be noted that larger k values 
indicate more rapid (steeper) discounting. In hyperbolic discounting, the basic 
assumption of the discounted utility model is that the subjective value of a series of 
delayed rewards is equivalent to the sum of the instantaneous discounted utilities, but 
the discount rate is time-dependent. Specifically, for hyperbolic discounting, the 
discount rate:= −(dV(D)/dD)/V(D)=k/(1+kD) (see Appendix I, for the general definition 
of a discount rate), which is a decreasing function of delay D (note that in usual settings, 
the discount rate is positive: k>0, referred to as "positive time preference"). A number of 
behavioral economic, neuropsychopharmacological studies have reported that human 
and animal intertemporal choice behavior is better described by the hyperbolic model, 
when compared to the exponential model (Ainslie, 2005; Bickel and Marsch, 2001; 
Crean  et al., 2002; Estle  et al., 2007; Frederick et al., 2002; Kable and Glimcher, 
2007; Mazur, 1987; Ohmura et al., 2005; Ohmura et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2003; 
Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004; Reynolds, 2006; Sozou, 1998; Takahashi, 2005; 
Takahashi et al., 2007e). Let us examine the neuropsychoeconomic implications of 
inconsistent hyperbolic discounting behavior. 
First, it is to be noted that the preference for more immediate rewards per se is 
not irrational or inconsistent, because there are opportunity costs and risk associated 
with non-gaining (e.g., due to possible hazards during waiting for the delayed rewards) 
in delaying the rewards. Therefore, impulsivity in intertemporal choice (a large discount 
rate) is rationalizable for several types of people. In Becker and Murphy's theory of 
rational addiction (1988), addicts are supposed to have large discount rates, leading to 
ignoring future delayed health loss and preferring immediate euphoria obtained from 
drug intake, in a completely consistent (i.e., rational) manner. This behavior is clinically 
problematic, but economically rational when their choices are time-consistent (i.e., if 
they have large discount rates with an exponential discount function). However, it is 
known that addicts also discount delayed outcomes hyperbolically (Bickel and Marsh, 
2001; Bickel et al., 2006; Reynolds, 2006, for a review), suggesting the intertemporal 
choices of addicts are time-inconsistent, resulting in a loss of self-control (see Bickel 
and Marsch, 2001, for a review). It is to be stressed here that problem B is a plan 
regarding intertemporal choice in the distant future; i.e., at one year later from now 
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(because the agents cannot take future actions now); while problem A is an 
intertemporal choice action. The time-inconsistency between intertemporal choice plans 
and actions is problematic in the sense that even if an agent had made patient and 
forward-looking plans regarding the distant future (as in problem B), as the time of 
executing the plan approaches the present s/he will cancel the patient plan and act more 
impulsively at the moment of intertemporal choice actions, against his/her own 
previously-intended plan. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the 
decision-maker's intentions (will) and actions (behavior), indicating that in 
intertemporal choice problems, most people cannot act as they intended/planned in 
advance (Ainslie, 2005; Frederick et al., 2002; Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Takahashi, 
2005). 
A number of economic studies (e.g., Laibson, 1997) state that this dynamic 
inconsistency may explain various problematic behaviors. The problematic behaviors 
associated with inconsistency in intertemporal choice which have been studied are: loss 
of self-control, failure in formerly-planned abstinence from addictive substances and 
relapse, a dead-line rush due to procrastination, failure in saving enough before 
retirement (although people at younger ages tend to plan/want to save for their 
retirement in later life, most of them at middle ages do not reduce consumptions 
enough), and risky sexual behavior (Chesson et al., 2006). 
In addition to the "dynamic inconsistency", previous behavioral economic 
studies have observed several anomalies in intertemporal choice; e.g., sign effects (gain 
is more rapidly discounted than loss), and magnitude effects (smaller gain is more 
rapidly discounted than larger gain) (see Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Frederick et al., 
2002, for a review). However, while neurochemical studies have examined 
neuropharmacological modulations of these effects in intertemporal choice (Bickel and 
Marsch, 2001; Takahashi et al., 2006 b; Takahashi et al., 2007 c; Takahashi et al., 2007 
g), no neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural processing underlying these 
anomalies (but also see Berns et al., 2006, for a neuroimaging study of intertemporal 
choice for pain). More neuroimaging studies are needed for elucidating 
neuropsychoeconomic correlates of these anomalies. Furthermore, a "domain effect" in 
intertemporal choice (i.e., directly consumable rewards such as foods and addictive 
substances are more rapidly discounted than money) has also been observed (Bickel et 
al., 1999; Estle et al., 2007). A recent neuroimaging study (McClure et al., 2007) 
examined the neural correlates of temporal discounting for a primary reward (i.e., 
water) and reported that the reward-processing neural circuits for delay discounting of 
money and water were distinct. It should further be noted that “actually experience 
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now” and “plans of an imagined future” may induce distinct neuropsychological 
processes in temporal discounting. Specifically, the difference between choices A and B 
may be fundamental (in spite of the same time-intervals between the choices 1 and 2) in 
the sense that in A you have the possibility to consume/experience the reward now, that 
is, to give in to the urge for coffee now. This speculation is in line with the domain 
effect. Future neuroeconomic studies should examine the neural correlates of temporal 
discounting for addictive substances which subjects are dependent on. 
Because information regarding the neurochemical substrates underlying 
intertemporal choice is important for (i) establishing neuropharmacological treatment of 
addiction and (ii) elucidating intertemporal choice behavior at the molecular level, I will 
next introduce neurochemical substrates for computational models of reinforcement 
learning and intertemporal choice in relation to brain regions (Section 2). Then, I will 
explain novel mathematical frameworks for temporal discounting behavior which have 
been recently introduced in neuroeconomics (Section 3). Section 4 presents more 
detailed characteristics of the novel discount models, with emphasis on the 
time-dependency of discount rates and behavioral interpretations. Furthermore, I will 
denote a hypothetical account of time-inconsistency in intertemporal choice based on 
the psychophysics of time-perception (Section 5). Finally, I will discuss some 
conclusions and implications with proposals for specific research directions based on 
the unified view (Section 6). 
 
2. Neurochemistry of intertemporal choice 
Several neurobiologists and economists have recently started to examine neural 
correlates of intertemporal choice by utilizing neuroimaging techniques (McClure et al., 
2004; Hariri et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2007; Monterosso et al., 2007; Wittmann  et 
al., 2007a; Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Until recently, neurobiological studies on 
temporal discounting have mainly been conducted by computational neuroscientists in 
order to model reinforcement learning processes, especially in temporal difference (TD) 
learning theory (Dayan and Abbott, 2001), and parameters in the theory have been 
associated with neurochemical substrates (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Schultz, 2004; 
Schweighofer et al., 2007).  
“Reinforcement learning” has been investigated extensively in computer 
science because degree of computational complexity and memory loading of the 
reinforcement learning algorithms are lower than that of conventional dynamic 
programming algorithms (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998), and therefore it is 
plausible that the reinforcement learning algorithms may be implemented in the brain 
 10
(Dayan and Abbott, 2001). The central objective of reinforcement learning is to estimate 
the value function (i.e., a summation of subjective values of delayed rewards): 
 V(s(t))=E[ ],              (Equation 2-1) )(
0
ktv
k
k +∑∞
=
δ
where v(t), v(t+1), v(t+2), … are the rewards acquired by following a certain policy 
P(a|s) (defined below) starting from state s(t), and δ  is a discount factor independent 
of time t (such that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). Note that E[x] indicates the expected value of x, 
following the standard notation in statistics. Therefore, the reinforcement theory adopts 
the discrete-time exponential discounting framework. The value functions for the states 
before and after the state-transition should satisfy the recursive relation (i.e., a 
consistenty equation, Sutton and Barto, 1998): 
 V(s(t-1))=E[v(t)+δ V(s(t))].            (Equation 2-2) 
Hence, the deviation (i.e., the prediction error) from the consistency equation 
 Δ(t)=v(t)+δ V(s(t))-V(s(t-1))           (Equation 2-3) 
should be zero on average. This deviation is defined as the temporal difference (TD) 
error in reward prediction (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Dayan and Abbott, 2001) and is 
utilized to update the value function: 
 ΔV(s(t-1))=α Δ(τ).                                       (Equation 2-4) 
where α is the learning rate (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The “policy” function is often 
defined via the action value function Q(s(t),a) which represents the value of future 
rewards the subject would obtain by taking the action a at the state s(t). The policy 
function defined in this manner is expressed as: 
 P(ai|s(t))= ∑ =Mj jL
iL
atsQ
atsQ
1
)),((exp(
)),((exp(
β
β ,     (Equation 2-5) 
where the parameter βL is called the “inverse temperature” (because this parameter 
plays the same role as the inverse of absolute temperature in the Boltzmann distribution 
function utilized in thermostatistical physics, Dayan and Abbott, 2001). We here assume 
the subject utilizes the “soft-max” strategy, following the standard theory of 
reinforcement learning in theoretical neuroscience (Dayan and Abbott, 2001). It is to be 
noted that the efficiency of the reinforcement learning theory crucially depends on 
parameter values of α, Lβ  and δ. It is also important to note that δ corresponds to a 
time-constant discount factor (see Appendix I, for the relation between a discount rate 
and a discount factor), indicating that agents following the reinforcement learning 
theory discount delayed rewards in a time-consistent manner and never experience 
“preference reversal” over time. Neurochemical studies on the reinforcement learning 
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theory have proposed that α, Lβ  and δ are associated with distinct neurotransmitters, 
i.e., acetylcholine, norepinephrine (noradrenaline), and serotonin, respectively. In vivo 
neurophysiological studies in primates have established that dopaminergic neural 
activities of the striatum in the brain encode the TD error signals in the reinforcement 
learning theory (Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Schultz, 2004). Therefore, it is important to 
examine neuromodulation of temporal discounting in order to further develop the 
reinforcement learning models in neuroscience. It is also again to be noted that, contrary 
to the assumption in the reinforcement learning theory, behavioral studies have reported 
that humans and animals discount rewards hyperbolically (Mazur, 1987; Ainslie, 2005; 
see Frederick et al., 2002, for a review, but see Schweighofer et al., 2006). 
Several neuroeconomic studies have reported that neurochemical substrates are 
associated with human and animal subjects' hyperbolic discount rates (again note that 
most behavioral studies observed that subjects discount hyperbolically, rather than 
exponentially; in contrast to computational models of reinforcement learning). These 
investigations into the neurochemical substrates underlying hyperbolic discounting are 
important for neuroeconomic understandings of impulsivity and inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice, aas well as for reducing these problematic tendencies. It is to be 
noted that impulsive intertemporal choice is clinically problematic (especially in drug 
addicts); while inconsistency in intertemporal choice is both clinically and economically 
problematic. The advantages of studying the neurochemical correlates of intertemporal 
choice is that (i) these studies may reveal rigorous biophysical mechanisms underlying 
hyperbolic discounting and (ii) neurochemical understanding of hyperbolic discounting 
may help to establish medical tretments (e.g., pharmacological treatment) for addiction 
and problematic economic behaviors. However, it must be noted that because we still do 
not have non-invasive methods for selectively activating and inactivating neural 
activities in humans, from an ethical perspective, psychopharmacological treatments are 
the only available neurobiological methods in humans. To date, several types of 
neuromolulators such as serotonin, dopamine, addictive drugs such as nicotine and 
heroin, as well as neuroactive hormones such as cortisol, testosterone, and adrenaline 
have been reported to be associated with intertemporal choice. Because most studies on 
the neurochemical modulation of intertemporal choice assume the hyperbolic discount 
model and examine how the discount rate of the hyperbolic model is associated with the 
concentration of neurochemical substances and the activities of neuromodulators, we 
now focus on the neuromodulations of impulsivity in temporal discounting. The 
problem of ignoring neuropharmacological correlates of the inconsistency in temporal 
discounting in most literature in neuropsychopharmacological studies of intertemporal 
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choice is discussed later (see Section 3). 
 
2.1 Serotonin and intertemporal choice 
 Serotonergic systems are known to relate to mood disorders such as depression, 
and anti-depressants (such as prozac, a type of SSRIs, selective seronotnin reuptake 
inhibitors) typically activate serotonergic neural activities by reducing the reuptake of 
serotonin in synaptic extracellular spaces in neural circuits (Asberg et al., 1986). Mobini 
et al (2000a) was the first study to report that a reduction in serotonergic activities 
increases hyperbolic discount rates in rodents. The same authors reported that the 
alterations in serotonergic systems did not affect risk attitude in decision under 
uncertainty ("probability discounting") in rodents (Mobini et al., 2000b). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that serotonergic activities in the rodent brain modulate intertemporal 
choice, but not risk-taking behavior. In humans however, a reduction in serotonergic 
activities did not significantly increase a time-discount rate (Crean et al., 2002; 
Schweighofer et al., 2006), indicating that the role of serotonergic activity in 
decision-making is still inconclusive. It is important to further investigate the roles of 
serotonergic systems in intertemporal choice in order to understand impulsive behaviors 
observed in psychiatric patients (e.g. suicide attempts by depressive patients, Renaud et 
al., 2007). Moreover, a recent study by computational neuroscientists has demonstrated, 
based on the TD model in reinforcement learning theory, that the modulation of 
serotonergic activities induced by the regulation of tryptophan (a precursor of serotonin) 
levels affected the evaluation of delayed reward in a time-dependent manner (Tanaka et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.2 Dopamine and intertemporal choice 
 Dopaminergic neural systems (e.g., the ventral tegmental area, the nucleus 
accumbens) are reward-processing brain regions. Recent developments in reinforcement 
learning theory of dopaminergic systems have elucidated the importance of reward 
prediction (Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Schultz, 2004). Specifically, neurons in the 
striatum encode the reward predictin error in TD model (the deviation from the 
consistency equation) in the reinforcement learning theory; while the neural activity of 
nucleus accumbens encodes the prediction/anticipation of the value of a reward (Dayan 
and Abbott, 2001; Schultz, 2004). The dopaminergic systems also have pivotal roles in 
temporal discounting. Notably, behavioral economist Loewenstein and cognitive 
neuroscientist Cohen's group has reported that impulsive intertemporal choice between 
immediate and delayed money is associated with the activation of dopaminergic 
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systems such as the ventral tegmental area (McClure et al., 2004); and Kable and 
Glimcher (2007) demonstrated that a subjective value of a delayed reward is associated 
with the activation of dopaminergic neural circuits. Also, it is known that a reduction in 
a serotonergic activity in the brain attenuates the reducing effect of dopaminergic drugs 
(d-amphetamine) on hyperbolic discount rates (Winstanley et al., 2005), indicating that 
there are interactions between serotonergic and dopaminergic systems in modulating 
intertemporal choice. Furthermore, it has been proposed that electrical coupling via 
non-synaptic gap junctions between dopamine neurons may cause inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice via altered time-perception (Takahashi, 2005; Takahashi, 2006a). 
Therefore, dopmaninergic modulations of intertemporal choice and time-perception 
should be more extensively examined in future neuroeconomic studies (a mathematical 
model relating time-perception to intertemporal choice will be introduced later). 
Regarding neuropsychiatric illnesses, a recent study reported that schizophrenic patients 
(who are known to have altered dopamine activities) have larger discount rates in 
comparison to healthy controls (Heerey et al., 2007). 
 
2.4 Addictive drugs and intertemporal choice 
 Chronic intake of addictive drugs such as nicotine, heroin, 
(metha)amphetamine and cocaine has been associated with impulsive intertemporal 
choice (nicotine and discounting: Bickel et al., 1999; Ohmura et al., 2005, Reynolds et 
al., 2003; heroin and discounting: Kirby et al., 1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; 
amphetamine and discounting: Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2006). These 
findings are consistent with Becker and Murphy's theory of rational addiction (Becker 
and Murphy, 1988), in that addicts put small weight on their health values in later life. 
The next question is whether these substance abusers and addicts were originally 
impulsive in intertemporal choice (before the onset of drug addiction) or have become 
impulsive due to the neuropsychopharmacological effects of habitual drug intake. 
Recent studies have investigated this question by employing human and animal subjects. 
In human studies, it is ethically problematic to administrate addictive drugs to 
non-drug-dependent healthy subjects. Therefore, recent studies have examined the 
stability of addicts' discount rates over time after abstinence. If large discount rates are 
due to habitual drug intake, it is expected that discount rates decreased after long-term 
abstinence. However, it has recently been reported that for alcoholics and smokers, 
abstinence did not dramatically reduce discount rates of former alcoholics and smokers 
(Yoon et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2007c).  
In animal studies, Dallery and Locey (2005) have reported that chronic nicotine 
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administration causes long-lasting increases in time-discount rates in rats, and Simon et 
al (2007) reported the same effect of cocaine in rats. Together, it can be supposed that 
the chronic intake of addictive drugs may increase discount rates in a long-lasting 
manner. However, no study to date has examined whether addictive drugs increase 
time-inconsistency in intertemporal choice. 
 
2.5 Neuroactive hormones and intertemporal choice 
 It is well known that human and animal behaviors are under strong influences 
of neuroactive hormones such as cortisol (a human stress hormone), testosterone (a 
male hormone), and estradiol (a female hormone). The roles of the hormones in human 
social behavior have extensively been examined; while those in economic 
decision-making have relatively less extensively been studied (Caldú and Dreher, 2007). 
These hormones are the neuromodulators of the dopaminergic systems, and control the 
saliency of rewards via the effects on alertness, motivation, and arousal (Kelly et al., 
2005). Furthoremore, electrophysiological studies demonstrated that dopaminergic, 
reward-processing neurons have receptors of a stress hormone and their activity was 
modulated by a stress hormone via glucocorticoid receptors (Saal et al., 2003). Namely, 
addictive drugs (e.g., ethanol, cocaine, and nicotine) and stress hormones trigger a 
common neuronal adaptation in dopaminergic circuits at the molecular level (Kauer, 
2003). It is therefore expected that intertemporal choice is also under the influences of 
the neuroactive hormones. 
 The first investigation into the roles of neuroactive steroid hormones has been 
performed on cortisol (a stress hormone) in humans. Cortisol is secreted via the 
activation of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in response to stressors 
(McEwen, 2003) and has euphoric and anxiolytic effects appearing via the activations 
of glucocorticoid receptors in the brain, although cortisol also has memory impairment 
effects in the hippocampus (Takahashi et al., 2004 b). Drug addicts have low arousal 
and therefore reduced cortisol response. This reduction in cortisol response and arousal 
in addicts may be associated with their drug intake, because cortisol has both euphoric 
and arousing effects (Plihal et al., 1996). Consistent with these findings, Takahashi 
(2004 a) demonstrated that subjects with low cortisol levels were more impulsive in 
intertemporal choice, indicating that deficiency in cortisol-induced euphoric actions in 
the brain under stressful events may lead to a demand for the immediate pleasure 
available from drug intake. This may result in the observation that drug addicts have 
low cortisol levels and attenuated cortisol response to psychosocial stressors (al'Absi, 
2006). This is also in line with the van Honk et al.(2003)’s report that impulsive and 
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disadvantageous behavior in the Iowa gamgling task (referred to as “future myopia” and 
“insensitivity to future consequences”, Bechara et al., 1994) was associated with low 
cortisol levels. 
 Testosterone, a male hormone, has been associated with impulsivity and 
aggression in males (Archer, 2006). However, examinations into the relationships 
between testosterone and temporal discounting are quite few. Takahashi et al. (2006) 
reported that when hyperbolic discount rate was utilized for assessing the impulsivity in 
intertemporal choice, an inverted U relationship between discount rate and testosterone 
level was observed in male humans. Also, Takahashi (2007) reported that, when a 
discount factor is utilized as a measure of patience in intertemporal choice, testosterone 
was positively associated with male subjects' discount factors. These results may reflect 
complex interactions between testosterone and dopaminergic activities, and conversion 
of testosterone into estradiol (a female hormone) in the brain (Hojo et al., 2004). In any 
case, testosterone was not related to impulsivity in temporal discounting for losses. This 
indicates that anti-androgen therapy may not be effective when the subjects' problematic 
behavior is associated with insensitivities to future bad outcomes. 
 Because (a) adrenaline (or adrenalin/epinephrine) is associated with alertness 
and arousal (Ramos and Arnsten, 2007) and (b) patience and self-control in 
intertemporal choice requires high degrees of arousal, (note that sleep deprivation 
increases discount rates, Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004), the relationship between 
adrenergic activities and temporal discounting may be important. However, only one 
study to date has examined this relationship (Takahashi et al., 2007 d). Because 
adrenaline levels in the brain cannot directly be measured in a non-invasive manner, 
Takahashi et al (2007 d) has utilized salivary alpha-amylase levels as an index of 
adrenergic activities. They demonstrated that subjects with lower salivary 
alpha-amylase levels were more impulsive in intertemporal choice (a larger hyperbolic 
discount rate), in line with the previous finding that subjects with low arousal (e.g., 
sensation seekers) are more impulsive and susceptible to drug addiction (Zuckerman, 
1990). 
 Collectively, it can be said that impulsivity in temporal discounting is strongly  
influenced by addictive drugs and neurochemical substrates including neuroactive 
hormones. This is consistent with the proposed neuromodulation of parameters in 
reinforcement learning theory. However, as we have seen, little is known regarding the 
neuromodulation of dynamic inconsistency in intertemporal choice. As noted, the 
reinforcement learning theory assumes exponential discounting, rather than hyperbolic 
discounting (dynamically-inconsistent discounting), and it is still unknown how 
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hyperbolic discounting should be implemented in the reinforcement learning theory. 
Furthermore, there has been no good measure of inconsistency in intertemporal choice 
in behavioral studies (but see Prelec, 2004, for an axiomatic definition of 
time-inconsistency, i.e., “decreasing impatience”). Strictly speaking, it cannot be 
concluded that the mentioned neuromodulations of the degrees to which subjects 
discount delayed rewards are solely attributable to changes in discount rates. 
Specifically, it is possible that the neuromodulators had also changed the functional 
forms of subject's temporal discounting function. There has been no appropriate 
framework for assessing the degree of hyperbolicity of the time-discounting function 
(i.e., time-inconsistency). Recent studies in econophysics and neuroeconomics have 
developed better discount models; i.e., the q-exponential discount function and the 
generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount function. I will introduce these models below and 
discuss the usefulness of these new discount models in neuropsychoeconomics. 
 
3. Novel models of temporal discounting behavior 
 Recently, behavioral neuroeconomic and econophysical studies have proposed 
two discount models, in order to better describe the neural and behavioral correlates of 
impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice. It is to be noted that 
"econophysics" is an interdisciplinary field in which theoretical tools of statistical 
physics are applied to economic and financial phenomena (see Stanley et al., 1996; 
Stauffer, 2004, for a review). Econophysical studies have traditionally paid attention to 
problems in macroeconomic and financial phenomena (e.g., income inequality, 
inefficiency in stock markets), rather than those in individual decision-making. Recently 
however, individual choice such as decision under risk has also been attracting 
econophysicists' attention (Bordley, 2005). In econophysical studies on intertemporal 
choice, it may be useful to employ mathematical frameworks of Tsallis non-extensive 
thermostatistics (Tsallis, 1988) which have originally been applied to study 
non-classical physical characteristics of stellar structures (Plastino and Plastino, 1993). 
Actually, Tsallis statistics-based frameworks have also been utilized for elucidating 
human decision-making, perception of risk, and biological systems (Tsallis, 1995). 
 
3.1 q-exponential discount model 
As described above, neuroeconomic studies of addiction have been focusing on 
impulsivity in intertemporal choice, rather than dynamic inconsistency, although the 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice is also important especially in order to better 
understand addicts' problematic behavior (e.g., relapse). In order to describe human and 
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animal subject's intertemporal choice behaviors in a manner which we can dissociate 
impulsivity and inconsistency, recent econophysical studies (Cajueiro, 2006; Takahashi 
et al, 2007 e) have proposed and examined the following q-exponential discount 
function for subjective value V(D) of delayed reward: 
  
V(D)=A/ expq(kqD)=A/[1+(1-q)kqD]1/(1-q)         (Equation 3.1) 
 
where expq (. ) is a "q-exponential" function (formally defined below), D is a delay until 
receipt of a reward, A is the value of a reward at D=0, and kq is a parameter of 
impulsivity at delay D=0 (q-exponential discount rate). The q-exponential function is 
defined as: 
expq(x):=[1+(1-q)x]1/(1-q). 
We can easily see that this q-exponential function approaches a usual exponential 
function in the limit of q→1 (by utilizing l'Hospital's theorem or the definition of an 
exponential function). The q-exponential function has been extensively utilized in 
studies in econophysics in the application of Tsallis' non-extensive thermostatistics 
which may explain income distributions following power functions (Michael and 
Johnson, 2003), although the q-exponential discount model has not frequently been 
utilized in neuroeconomics. 
It is to be noted that when q=0, equation 1 is the same as a hyperbolic discount 
function (i.e., V(D)=A/(1+kqD)), while q→1, is the same as an exponential discount 
function (i.e., V(D)=Aexp(-kqD)). In exponential discounting (q→1 in equation 1), 
preference reversal never occurs, because the discount rate:= -(dV/D)/V=kq is 
time-independent when q→1. While the dynamics of discount rates will more 
extensively be addressed below, the important point here is that the q-exponential 
discount model can distinctly parametrize impulsivity and dynamic consistency in 
intertemproal choice. Conventional models of temporal discounting (i.e., exponential 
and hyperbolic discount models) cannot achieve this economically important goal. 
Furthermore, because econophysics is also a new important approach to understanding 
paradoxes in economic and financial phenomena, econophysic frameworks may aid in 
solving problems in neuroeconomics. However, very rarely have neuroeconomics and 
econophysics been combined. 
Takahashi et al. (2007 e) have shown that the q-exponential discount function 
is capable of continuously quantifying human subjects' inconsistency in intertemporal 
choice. Namely, human agents with smaller q values are more inconsitent in 
intertemporal choice. If q is less than 0, the intertemproal choice behavior is more 
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inconsistent than hyperbolic discounting (in other words, the discount rate of the 
q-exponential function with q<0 more rapidly decreases than that of the simple 
hyperbolic discount function, i.e., “hyper-hyperbolic”, see 4.1, for mathematical details). 
Additionally, 1-q can be utilized as an inconsistency parameter. Hence, future studies 
should examine neuromodulation of kq (impulsivity) and q (dynamic consistency) in the 
q-exponential discount model. An important application of the q-exponential discount 
model may be to examine whether addicts are more inconsistent than 
non-drug-dependent controls. This examination may be a direct test of the rational 
addiction theory (Becker and Murphy, 1988), because Becker and Murphy's rational 
addiction theory states that addicts consistently maximizes the sum of discounted 
utilities from drug intake (immediate reward) and health loss (delayed loss). The 
consistency here refers to exponential discounting (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Recently, 
health economists have examined whether addicts are more time-inconsistent than 
healthy controls (Blondel et al., 2007), but this study has limitations in the sense that the 
analytical framework was not quantitatively rigorous. The present framework may 
provide a more rigorous methodology of assessing addicts' consistency in intertemporal 
choice. 
 
3.2 generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount model 
 Behavioral economists have proposed that the inconsistency in intertemporal 
choice may be attributable to an internal conflict between "multiple selves" within a 
decision maker (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The proposal is 
persuasive in the sense that we often feel regret after an impulsive choice. The existence 
of the feeling of regret even after acting as one intended (i.e, not being forced to make a 
certain choice) may be a strong evidence of human behavior's inconsistency and internal 
conflict between desires inconsistent with each other. This hypothesis states that (a) 
there are (at least) two exponential discounting selves (i.e., two exponential discount 
rates) in a single human individual and (b) when delayed rewards are at the distant 
future (>1 year), the self with a smaller discount rate wins; while delayed rewards 
approach to the near future (within a year), the self with a larger discount rate wins, 
resulting in preference reversal over time (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
This intertemporal choice behavior has been referred to as quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
(also as a β-δ model, see below) (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
Originally, the quasi-hyperbolic model has been proposed in a discrete-time version. In 
the discrete time, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting F(τ) for discrete time τ (the unit has 
been assumed to be one year) is defined as (Laibson, 1997): 
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F(τ)=β δτ (for τ=1,2,3,…) and F(0) =1 (0<β<δ<1). 
The quasi-hyperbolic discount model captures human bias in intertemporal choice; i.e., 
a discount factor between the present and one-time period later (β) is smaller than that 
between two future time-periods (δ). In other words, people are patient in planning their 
intertemporal choice in the distant future, but impulsive in intertemporal choice action 
occurring at delay D=0. Therefore, this simple quasi-hyperbolic function has a kink at 
the time point of τ=1 (year). This model therefore predicts a distinction in impulsivities 
between an intertemporal choice executed at delays >1 year and <1 year. A previous 
neuroeconomic study (McClure et al., 2004) demonstrated that the activation in 
dopaminergic midbrain regions (the ventral striatum) was associated with β; while the 
activation in the prefrontal cortex was associated with δ, indicating that there is a 
"neural conflict" between impulsive and patient selves in the brain. 
Furthermore, a recent neuroeconomic study on temporal discounting for primary 
rewards in thirsty subjects utilizing functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging 
(McClure et al., 2007), has proposed a generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount model in 
which "dual selves" are linearly weighted at each delay. In the continuous time, the 
study's proposed model is equivalent to the linearly-weighted two-exponential functions 
(generalized quasi-hyperbolic discounting): 
 
V(D)=A[w exp(-k1D)+(1-w)exp(-k2D)]                     (Equation 3.2) 
 
where 0<w<1 is a weighting parameter and k1 and k2 are two exponential discount rates 
(k1<k2). Note that the larger exponential discount rate of the two (k2) corresponds to an 
impulsive self; while the smaller discount rate k1 corresponds to a patient self. Also, it is 
easy to see that if w=1 or 0, this discount model is the same as the exponential 
discounting. The mentioned neuroeconomic study, employing thirsty human subjects, 
observed that, within a single subject, the "impulsive self" (a larger discount rate k2) was 
associated with neural activity in the reward-processing midbrain regions; while the 
"patient self" (k1) was associated with prefrontal brain regions in temporal discounting 
for primary rewards (McClure et al., 2007). However, it must be noted that in this 
neuroimaging study, the generalized quasi-hyperbolic model was originally proposed as 
a discrete-time discount function. Although the psychological interpretation of 
inconsistent intertemporal choice behavior in quasi-hyperbolic discounting is intuitively 
appealing, no study to date has compared the goodness-of-fit between the (generalized) 
quasi-hyperbolic discount model and the q-exponential discount model in an empirical 
manner. This examination should be performed in future neuropsychoeconomic studies. 
 20
 
4. Discount rates in q-exponential and generalized quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
 Because explicit expressions of a discount rate and its time-dependency are 
important, next I will summarize the properties of discount rates in the q-exponential 
and the generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount models. It is important to again note that 
in any continuous time-discounting function, a discount rate is defined as 
-(dV(D)/dD)/V(D), independently of functional forms of discount models, and larger 
discount rate indicates more impulsive intertemporal choices (see Appendix I). 
 
4.1 Discount rate in the q-exponential discount model 
In the q-exponential discount model, the discount rate as defined is: 
 
(q-exponential discount rate)=kq/(1+kq(1-q)D).          (Equation 3.3) 
 
We can see that when q=1, the discount rate is independent of delay D, corresponding to 
exponential discount model (consistent intertemporal choice); while for q<1, the 
discount rate is a decreasing function of delay D, resulting in preference reversal. This 
can be seen by a direct calculation of the time-derivative of the q-exponential discount 
rate: 
 
(d /dD)(q-exponential discount rate)= −kq2(1-q)/(kq(1-q)D+1)2      (Equation 3.4) 
 
which is negative for q<1, indicating "decreasing impatience" for q smaller than 1. Also, 
impulsivity at delay D=0 is equal to kq irrespective of q. Therefore, kq and q can 
parametrize impulsivity and consistency, respectively, in a distinct manner. Notably, 
when q is negative, the speed of a decrease in the q-exponential discount rate is faster 
than the hyperbolic discount rate (i.e., “hyper-hyperbolic”). Because this distinction 
between impulsivity and dynamic inconsistency is important for economic theory, 
future neuroeconomic studies should examine how neuromodulators such as serotonin, 
dopamine, addictive drugs, and neuroactive hormones affect kq and q, distinctly. 
 
4.2 Discount rate in the generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount model 
 For the generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount model (Equation 2), the discount 
rate is: 
 
[k2(1-w)exp(-k2D)+k1w exp(-k1D)]/[(1-w)exp(-k2D)+w exp(-k1D)].   (Equation 3.5) 
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It is to be noted that at delay D=0, the generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount rate = 
wk1+(1-w)k2. This indicates that impulsivity in an intertemporal choice action (at delay 
D=0) corresponds to linearly-weighted discount rates at delay D. The time-derivative of 
the discount rate, i.e., (d/dD) (a generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount rate) is: 
 
-w(1-w)(k2-k1)2exp(k2D+k1D)/[wexp(k2D)+(1-w)exp(k1D)]2,       (Equation 3.6) 
 
which is negative because 1-w>0. This also indicates that the discount rate is a 
decreasing function of delay, again indicating "decreasing impatience". 
Neuropsychologically, the weighted difference between discount rates k2>k1: 
 
 (1-w)k2-wk1                                             (Equation 3.7) 
 
may indicate the strength of "internal conflict" between impulsive and patient selves in 
intertemporal choice, and this can be regarded as an internal conflict parameter. The 
reason is that this parameter indicates the degree of disagreement between weighted 
impulsive and patient selves in intertemporal choice. No neuroeconomic study to date 
has examined the relationship between the conflict parameter and the q-parameter in the 
q-exponential discount model, i.e., an inconsistency parameter. One promising direction 
of future neuroeconomics studies may be to examine the relation between the conflict 
parameter (1-w)k2-wk1 and inconsistency parameter (1-q) in the two models in 
combination with neuroimaging. 
 
5. Time-perception and intertemporal choice 
 Recent behavioral, neuro- economic, and neuropharmacological studies 
collectively stress the importance of time-perception in intertemporal choice. It is to be 
noted that in the history of decision theory on uncertainty, both utility functions and 
probability have been replaced with more (neuro)psychological quantities, i.e., a value 
function with a gain-loss asymmetry and probability weighting function with a 
distortion in probability perception in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Prelec, 1998). More specifically, in the classical expected utility theory, the subjective 
value of an uncertain reward (each outcome xi has a probability pi) has the form: U(xi, 
pi)=Σi piu(xi); while in the present prospect theory, the subjective value ("prospect") is  
Σi w(pi)v(xi) where w(p) is a probability weighting function and v(xi) is a value function 
with a gain-loss asymmetry. Therefore, it may be supposed that the intertemporal choice 
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theories will also experience similar changes. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) took an 
initial step towards this direction, by attempting to explain the sign effect in 
intertemporal choice; i.e., gains are more rapidly discounted than losses of the same 
magnitudes (Frederick et al., 2002). According to this theory, the perceived magnitude 
of $10 loss is larger than that of $10 gain (because of the gain-loss asymmetry in the 
value function). Consequently, $10 loss is less rapidly discounted than $10 gain due to 
the magnitude effect (i.e., large outcomes are less rapidly discounted than smaller 
outcomes). In the Loewenstein-Prelec theory, a subjective value of a delayed reward is 
in the form of v(x)F(D) where v(x) is a value function (rather than a utility function) and 
F(D) is a discount function at delay D, which is still a purely economic quantity. Similar 
to prospect theory, it can be hypothesized that the correct discount function has the 
form: F(τ(D)), where τ(D) is a subjectively perceived length of delay D.  
Notably, Takahashi (2005) has proposed that exponential discounting with 
logarithmic time-perception: τ(D)=α log(1+βD) may explain dynamic inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice. More tellingly, if a subject discounts a delayed reward 
exponentially, but with the logarithmic time-perception (i.e., Weber-Fechner law in 
psychophysics), his/her temporal discount function has a hyperbolic form: 
F(τ)=exp(-k τ)=1/(1+βD)kα. Intuitively speaking, subjects try to discount a delayed 
reward exponentially (i.e., rationally and consistently), but actual intertemporal choice 
behavior may be hyperbolic and dynamically inconsistent, due to a distortion in 
time-perception (It is also to be noted that the exponential discount model with 
logarithmic time-peception is mathematically equivalent to the q-exponential discount 
model based on Tsallis’ statistics). There is accumulating evidence to support this 
hypothesis. First, one neuroimaging study has observed that when subjects make 
intertemporal choices, brain regions for time-perception such as the caudate nucleus (a 
type of dopamine systems) are activated in association with the delay length (Wittmann 
et al., 2007 a). Secondly, subjects with large discount rates have overestimated 
time-perception. For instance, substance abusers (Wittmann et al., 2007 b) and 
sleep-deprived subjects (Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004), known to have large discount 
rates, have prolonged time-perception. Thirdly, behavioral economists have reported 
that if the time of receiving a delayed reward is presented in the form of a calendar date 
(instead of time durations of delay length until receipt) the functional form of their 
temporal discounting becomes exponential, rather than hyperbolic (Read et al., 2005). 
This "delay/date effect" can be explained by considering that the presentation of a 
calendar date may reduce the non-linearity of the perception of delay length. Moreover, 
subadditive time-discounting---i.e., a discount factor is a decreasing function of a 
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time-interval between two alternatives---may also be explained by non-linear 
psychophysical transformation of objective time into psychological time (Read, 2001; 
Takahashi, 2006 a). Together, it appears to be promising to examine the relationships 
between neuropharmacological modulation of time-perception and that of intertemporal 
choice. Future neuropsychoeconomic studies along this line may help to understand the 
neural processing underlying the dynamic inconsistency in interetemporal choice. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
The present theoretical frameworks and proposals for future neuroeconomic 
studies on intertemporal choice have several implications: (i) one of the most important 
topics in economics, i.e., dynamic inconsistency, is still an unresolved difficult problem 
which should be attacked by neuroeconomists, (ii) investigations into neurochemical 
modulations of both impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice may be 
promising clues for better understanding the neural bases of intertemporal choice and 
this direction may help establish clinical treatment for problematic behaviors such as 
addiction, (iii) novel discount models such as the q-exponential discount model and the 
generalized quasi-hyperbolic model may be helpful in examining dynamic 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice, and (iv) the relationship between time-perception 
and intertemporal choice should more extensively studied by utilizing the present 
theoretical frameworks via neurochemical manipulation and neuroimaging. These 
future directions can probably be explored through standard neurobiological methods 
such as non-invasive neuroimaging with functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
neuropsychopharmacological manipulations, and neurogenetic analysis based on a huge 
amount of human genome data. 
With respect to the better understanding of neuro-cognitive processing involved 
in intertemporal choice, it may be important to examine the relationship between 
intertemporal choice and decision under risk (Lee, 2005). Several studies have proposed 
that a framework for intertemporal choice can also be utilized for decision under 
uncertainty (Rachlin, 1991; Takahashi et al., 2007 f). Notably, Rachlin et al (1991) have 
proposed that risk-aversion is attributable to temporal discounting (based on a molar 
maximization theory which assumes ergodicity in stochastic processes); while other 
studies try to attribute temporal discounting to risk-aversion and explain the 
hyperbolicity in temporal discounting (Sozou, 1998). Further studies are apparently 
necessary in order to reconcile these hypotheses. 
Moreover, Rachlin and colleagues have demonstrated that generosity/altruism 
for other people decreases as social distances for the others increase in a hyperbolic 
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manner (Jones and Rachlin, 2006). Therefore, it is of potential interest to examine 
whether common neurocognitive processing is underlying both temporal and social 
discounting (Takahashi, 2007 a). Specifically, if people both logarithmically perceive 
delay and social distance, as well as try to discount the values of a reward with the 
perceived delay and social distance, the reported hyperbolicity of both temporal and 
social discount functions may be attributable to a common psychophysical law (i.e. 
Weber-Fechner law). 
Furthermore, the utilization of the present novel frameworks (i.e., the 
q-exponential discount model and the generalized quasi-hyperbolic model) may also 
prove useful in analyzing governmental economic policy-making. The well-known 
behavioral economist Richard Thaler and his colleagues have proposed that there is a 
need for "libertarian paternalistic" policies for correcting biases in individual's behavior 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003), based on recent accumulating behavioral evidence that 
human behavior deviates from rational/normative economic theory. These behavioral 
anomalies include hyperbolic discounting, dynamic inconsistency, myopic loss aversion, 
and irrational addiction. However, these inconsistent decision-making manners may also 
be problematic in governmental policy-making (Garfinkel and Lee, 2000). This point is 
under strong controversy between behavioral economists such as Richard Thaler and 
neoclassical economists such as Gary Becker (Becker, 2006). Therefore, future 
neuropsychoeconomic studies should examine whether dynamic inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice is mitigated or not when the decision was made by other people 
(e.g., governmental officials), in order to resolve the controversy and establish ways to 
make more efficient socioeconomic policies (including drug regulation policies, see 
Badger et al., 2007, for an economic study on the related issue). The first attempt has 
already been performed: it was observed that intertemporal decision-making for others 
is more inconsistent and impulsive than decisions made for decision-maker herself 
(Takahashi, 2007 b). Combining present neuroeconomic theories with group decision 
theories may also help to resolve these issues. 
Finally, I will now propose suggestions for future studies based on the 
unification of the present frameworks. Specific examples may better illustrate how the 
present frameworks can be unified for elucidating neuropsychoeconomic processing 
underlying intertemporal choice. 
First, it may be important to examine (through fMRI etc.) the neural correlates 
of impulsivity (kq in the q-exponential discount function), time-consistency (q in the 
q-exponential function), and the degree of conflict between selves ((1-w)k2-wk1 in the 
generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount function) in intertemporal choice by addicts (e.g., 
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alcoholics, smokers, and heroin abusers), by utilizing the present frameworks. Our 
present theoretical examination predicts that (a) time-consistency and the degree of 
conflict may negatively be correlated, (b) addicts have larger impulsivity at delay=0 (kq) 
than non-drug-dependent controls, (c) kq may be positively associated with the 
activation of the midbrain dopaminergic systems (e.g., the ventral striatum), and (d) the 
conflict parameter (1-w)k2-wk1 may be associated with the activation of the anterior 
cingulated cortex (a conflict monitoring neural circuit) and the difference in the 
activations between the prefrontal and midbrain regions. It would also be important to 
examine the ways in which the q-exponential discount model can be incorporated into 
the reinforcement learning theory, since the reinforcement learning theory has 
extensively been utilized in primate neurophysiology and human fMRI studies (Dayan 
and Abbott, 2001; Schultz, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2007). It is also important to incorporate 
the q-exponential disconting into reinforcement learning theory, because actual 
intertemporal choice behavior is not exponential (assumed in the reinforcement learning 
theoretical models, Dayan and Abbott, 2001), but q-exponential (or hyper-hyperbolic). 
This investigation can be combined with neuroimaging studies. Moreover, as noted, the 
exponential discounting with logarithmic time-perception is equivalent to the 
q-exponential discounting. Therefore, how the psychophysical and 
neuropsychopharmacological effects on time-perception affect parameters of the 
q-exponential function should be examined. 
Additionally, in terms of economic policy-making it is of interest to compare 
the intertemporal choices for made for one’s self versus choices made for someone else 
via neuroimaing. The unified consideration from our present frameworks predicts that 
(a) during intertemporal choice for self, the midbrain dopaminergic regions may be 
more strongly activated than during that for someone else (because the receipt of 
monetary gain may be more rewarding than the giving), (b) simple hyperbolic and 
exponential discount rates may be smaller for intertemporal choice for others rather than 
the self, because the discount rate of intertemporal decisions for someone else more 
rapidly decreases than that for self (i.e., intertemporal choice plan for someone else is 
less impulsive than that for self), although kq (the q-exponential discount rate), namely 
impulsivity at delay D=0 (impulsivity in intertemporal action) is larger for someone else 
than that for self, (c) both prefrontal and midbrain activations during intertemporal 
choice for someone else may be smaller than those for self. Future neuroimaging studies 
may examine whether the predictions for the examples above are correct or not. 
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Appendix I: 
Intertemporal choice in neoclassical microeconomics 
 
Most people prefer an immediate reward to a delayed reward in intertemporal choice 
(delay discounting) (Ainslie 2005; Frederick et al., 2002; Ohmura et al., 2006). 
Intertemporal choice behavior is related to addiction, saving behavior, financial 
planning such as investment and retirement. Therefore, studies in behavioral and neuro- 
economics, psychopharmacology, behavioral finance, and econophysics have focused 
on how intertemporal choice is characterized in theoretical and empirical manners. In 
game theory, discounting is also important for understanding how iterated versions of 
games such as the prisoner's dilemma and self-control in intertemporal choice may be a 
neuropsychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation (Stevens and Hauser, 
2004), consistent with the folk theorem in game theory. In this section, a conventional 
framework for the economic modeling of intertemporal choice is introduced according 
to behavioral economist Laibson's article (Laibson, 2003). 
 In neoclassical mainstream microeconomics, intertemporal choice has been 
formulated through the discounted utility model proposed by Paul Samuelson (see 
Frederick et al., 2002, for a review). In the discounted utility model, it is assumed that a 
consumer’s welfare can be represented as a discounted sum of current and future 
instantaneous utility at each time point. Suppose that, at each time, the decision-maker 
consumes c(t). The instantaneous subjective value of the consumption is a utility 
function u(c(t)). 
In continuous-time intertemporal choice, the sum of the instantaneous 
discounted utilities is: 
                          
where F(D) is a discount function at delay D. A discount rate at delay D is defined as: 
 
                         r(D):= −(dF(D)/dD)/F(D). 
 
Note that larger discount rates correspond to more impulsive (less patient) intertemporal 
choice. On the other hand, a discount factor f(D) at delay D is defined as: 
 
        
f(D):=limΔ→0              =exp(-r(D))  
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Note that smaller discount factors indicate more impulsive intertemporal choice. In 
conventional neoclassical economics, it has been assumed that the discount rate is 
independent of D, confirming dynamic consistency of intertemporal choice. In this case, 
let us put r(D)=ρ, which is independent of delay D. The exponential discount function 
is then F(D)=exp(-ρ D). This exponential discount function can also be expressed as 
F(D)=δD where δ:=exp(-ρ). If we express the discount rate and the discount factor in 
terms of δ, we obtain: 
r(D)= ρ= −lnδ  
and 
f(D)=exp(-ρ)=δ. 
Therefore, in exponential discounting in the continuous-time formulation, (discount 
rate) = −ln (discount factor) and both are independent of delay D. In the Nobel Prize 
winning economist Becker and his colleague Murphy's theory of rational addiction, it is 
assumed that addicts maximize the sum of future discounted utilities with an 
exponential discount function, resulting in completely rational addiction even in the 
case of the strongest addiction to heroin, alcohol, and nicotine (Becker and Murphy, 
1988). It is important to note that a number of neuropsychopharmacological studies 
have demonstrated that addicts (e.g., heroin addicts, cocaine addicts, alcoholics, and 
smokers of cigarettes) have larger discount rates, in comparison to healthy 
non-drug-dependent subjects (Bickel and Marsch, 2001). This may be in line with the 
economic theory of addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), in terms of the degree to 
which a subject discounts a delayed reward (a discount rate). However, a rational 
intertemporal choice should have consistency over time (dynamic consistency) and 
empirical studies have repeatedly observed that human intertemporal choice does not 
have rationality in this sense. 
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